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I. INTRODUCTION

The recent wave of regime change and democratization in the
Middle East and North Africa has once again thrust transitional justice
* This article was prepared for presentation at the Africa and International Law: Taking Stock and
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concerns to the forefront of popular and legal interests. As several states
struggle to create a new future, the crimes and injustices of the past must
first be confronted. While the substantive goals of transitional justice
may be comparatively easy to identify, the procedure by which these
goals can be accomplished has been the subject of much debate, both
recently and throughout history. 1
The difficulty of the procedural aspect stems from an important
dichotomy. On one hand, it is vital that the populace of the transitional
state be fully responsible for the process. The importance of local
ownership or a “bottom up” approach has been addressed in great detail
by a multitude of scholars. 2 For example, Patricia Lundy and Mark
McGovern analyze this necessity with regard to the conflict in Northern
In particular, Lundy and McGovern argue that local
Ireland. 3
participation and consultation is vital at all stages of the process,
including “conception, design, decision making, and management.” 4 It
is not the intention of this paper to argue the importance of all of these
elements; it is merely to determine areas where such local ownership
may be inserted into transitional justice mechanisms.
On the other end of the dichotomy, it is vital that any transitional
justice mechanisms follow the internationally recognized fair trial rights
as contemplated by various international, regional and domestic human
rights documents. Without such adherence, the cycle of violence is
difficult to stem and a state risks losing the peace that transitional justice
mechanisms are intended to secure.5
This paper will attempt to contribute to that debate by identifying
this fundamental tension on a hypothetical level and discussing ways in
which it can be addressed, alongside other common problems of
transitional justice mechanisms. The paper is an attempt to build on the
vital work of Lars Waldorf, 6 who has examined the dichotomy with
1. See generally NELSON MANDELA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES: COUNTRY STUDIES (1995); Paige Arthur, How
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. R.
QUARTERLY 329 (2009).
2. See generally Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking
Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 L. & SOC. 265 (2008); Simon Chesterman, Ownership
in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations, 1 J. INTERVENTION
& STATEBUILDING 3 (2007).
3. Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2, at 265.
4. Id.
5. See generally Donna Pankhurst, Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political
Emergencies: Conceptualising Reconciliation, Justice and Peace, 20 THIRD W. QUARTERLY 239
(2010).
6. See generally Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as
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regard to post-genocide Rwanda by building a hypothetical framework
for use in any future situation, as opposed to one limited to a particular
set of events. Such a framework will provide vital insight that can be
drawn on to constantly improve the all-important mechanisms of
transitional justice.
In order to adequately examine this tension, several steps must be
taken. First, it is necessary to define the goals of transitional justice and
examine historical mechanisms that have been used. Without such a
survey, it would be impossible to judge success and correct past failings.
The focus of this paper will be only on prosecutions and other
mechanisms with formality and ability to punish akin to a prosecution.
Of the many such pseudo-prosecutions, particular focus will be paid to
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for their formality, their ability
to grant amnesty, and the darling space they occupy in the collective
public and scholarly imagination.7
Second, the importance of local ownership will be discussed. As
previously mentioned, a great deal of work has been done on this
particular topic. 8 The discussion in this article will be limited to the
problems associated with local ownership in transitional justice. There
are two extremes within this problem that will be discussed in this paper.
The majority of the discussion will focus on the many systems that local
populaces have considered imposed upon them by the international
community because of a lack of decision-making and no incorporation
of local norms. However, there will also be a discussion of the Rwandan
Gacaca, in which a local system was adopted nearly wholesale and has
still encountered extraordinary problems. 9
Third, the international law of fair trials will be examined through
international and regional human rights treaties and international case
law. 10 Various international courts have repeatedly examined the
requirements for a fair trial. The law will be surveyed in an attempt to
create a rough sketch as to what constitutes a fair trial under
international human rights law.
Within this sketch, various areas of flexibility will be identified.
These will be the areas in which traditional or local forms of justice can

Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass
Atrocity]; Lars Waldorf, A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s
Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1221 (2010).
7. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 78 (2010).
8. See generally, Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2; Chesterman, supra note 2.
9. Waldrof, Mass Justice of Mass Atrocity, supra note 6, at 11.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 109-112.
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be inserted without running into conflict with international human rights
norms. In particular, the distinction between what constitutes an
individual right and what is a requirement of the tribunal form will be
discussed. This article aims to demonstrate that while international law
mandates individual rights within a particular form, there exists some
flexibility in rights that fall within the form of the tribunal. This
distinction will be addressed in great detail later in the paper.
II. WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE?
In order to create a workable transitional justice mechanism, some
time must first be devoted to defining transitional justice. While many
have attempted to define the topic, a particularly useful definition comes
from the United Nations Working Group on Lessons Learned. 11
According to the Working Group, “Transitional justice is an approach to
systematic or massive violations of human rights that both provides
redress to victims and creates or enhances opportunities for the
transformation of the political systems, conflicts, and other conditions
that may have been at the root of the abuses.” 12
Another useful definition comes from Professor Ruti Teitel, who
states, “transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal
responses to confront . . . wrongdoings.” 13 Professor Teitel goes on to
mention the imperative that there be “repressive predecessor regimes,”
however, for the purposes of this article, that is too narrow. 14
The definitions above set forth the most important elements of
transitional justice efforts. First, there must have been an era where
there were massive human rights violations. Historically, these eras
have taken many forms, including times of war, oppressive and despotic
regimes, and times of massive civil upheaval. For the purposes of this
paper, such eras will be simply defined collectively as atrocities, as the
non-specific nature of the article requires that it allow for flexibility as
situations require, without presuming to know the details and exhaustive
requirements of each individual situation.
11. What is Transitional Justice? A Backgrounder, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_backgroun
d_note.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Teitel, supra note 7, at 69.
14. The scope of this article includes transitional justice situations in all post-atrocity
situations, including Professor Teitel’s “repressive predecessor regimes” along with civil wars,
massive periods of civil insurrection such as genocide and countless other atrocities. See id.
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Among the most important elements of transitional justice, set forth
in the first definition, is the fundamental conflict that lies at the heart of
all transitional justice efforts. While a primary goal is to provide some
form of redress or justice for victims of past violence and human rights
violations, that effort can often conflict with the competing goals of
transforming political systems and ending conflicts that were at the root
of the abuses. 15 It is this conflict that is responsible for such tremendous
historical difficulty in the creation of transitional justice mechanisms
that give justice to victims of past atrocities and simultaneously allow
for lasting peace and stability. 16
In order to reach a definition that is useful for the purposes of this
paper, the section below will examine a number of areas of transitional
justice. First, the above principles of transitional justice will be broken
down into concrete goals that have been used historically. Second, there
will be a brief examination of historical transitional justice mechanisms
and the problems experienced with such mechanisms. 17
A.

Importance and Goals

As is true for any form of justice, the most important step in any
attempt to define transitional justice is to determine what the goals of
such efforts are. Such a determination is particularly important when
attempting to create or upgrade mechanisms for transitional justice, as
the outcome will be determined by the mechanisms and the mechanisms
will be chosen based on their goals. While mentioned briefly above, the
broad goals of transitional justice are threefold. 18 The desire of such
efforts is to “ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation . . . .” 19
Such broad goals can be further broken down into concrete ideals.
Transitional justice efforts have included the creation of an accurate
historical record for society, 20 the restoration of the rule of law,21 the
15. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L.
R. 761, 766 (2003).
16. Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation: The
Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International Criminal Justice, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 247, 247 (2010).
17. Teitel, supra note 7, at 70.
18. UN Secretary General, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies’, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter SG Report 2004].
19. Id.
20. See generally Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, Preamble
(1995) (S.Afr.) (“To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as
possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during
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facilitation of reconciliation through the healing of divisions created by
long running atrocities and many others.22 Put broadly, the goals of
transitional justice fall under the competing values of justice and
reconciliation.23
The importance, then, is twofold. First, justice must be adequately
achieved. 24 Second, transitional justice efforts must lay the groundwork
for reconciliation from divisions fostered during periods of atrocity. 25
The fundamental conflict between on one hand punishing and on the
other reconciling has been among transitional justice’s biggest problems.
There are several important examples from history.
B. Previous Mechanisms
The history of modern transitional justice mechanisms is
traditionally understood as beginning with the trials that took place at the
conclusion of World War Two. 26 This includes both the Nuremberg
Trials and the Tokyo Tribunals. 27 However, transitional justice can be
traced back nearly as far as conflict itself. The field has been studied as
far back as the Ancient Athenians more than four centuries before the
Common Era. 28 In that instance it was not merely historical barbarism
where the offending parties were heinously killed or jailed, it was in fact
a complex formula balancing retribution and forgiveness that included
amnesties and reintegration. 29
Since that time there have been many different mechanisms used
for transitional justice. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were
formal international trials, organized and presided over by the Allied
Powers. 30 This type of formal, international trial scenario has been used
repeatedly in transitional justice, including ad hoc United Nations
[apartheid]”).
21. See generally Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Camille Pambpell Conaway & Lisa Kays,
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation, JUSTICE, GOVERNANCE & CIVIL SOC’Y 1, available at
http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/49_transitional_justice.pdf.
22. See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist
Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
23. Posner & Vermuele, supra note 15, at 766.
24. SG Report 2004, supra note 18, at 8.
25. Id.
26. Teitel, supra note 7, at 70.
27. Id.
28. Adriaa Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens: A Case Study, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
551, 551 (2010).
29. Id.
30. Belinda Cooper, Changing Hearts and Minds: The Domestic Influence of International
Tribunals, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 548 (1999).
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tribunals including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”), and other special courts for Sierra Leone, Cambodia and
others. 31 More recently, a permanent court has been set up to adjudicate
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other acts often present in
transitional justice scenarios.32 The International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) has recently injected itself into transitional justice by issuing
arrest warrants for Muammar Qaddafi and other members of the late
dictator’s inner circle during the Libyan revolution, thus renewing a
debate as to the role the Court should play in transitional justice. 33
In the cases of ad hoc international tribunals, there has often been
complementary adjudication through the domestic court systems of postatrocity states. 34 In this case, complementary jurisdiction refers to the
In one example,
primacy of the domestic court system. 35
complementary prosecutions took place initially in the wake of the
Rwandan genocide adjudication until the lack of capacity for the
genocide torn state made such a complementary prosecution scheme
impossible. 36
Such domestic prosecutions do not only serve as a complement to
international prosecutions. They can, and have, been used along with
many other types of transitional justice mechanisms. 37 They have been
particularly successful in complementing the so-called conditional
amnesty, most often in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission
(“TRC”). 38 Such TRC’s allow a person to escape prosecution for crimes
by coming forward and telling the story of said crimes. While the first
such TRC was created in Argentina, it is now predominantly associated
with the transition from Apartheid in South Africa.39
31. See generally Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to advance
Transitional Justice: In search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2006).
32. Teitel, supra note 7, at 74.
33. Alison Cole, Despite Calls for local justice, Gaddafi should be tried at the ICC,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/aug/23/gaddafi-justiceinternational-criminal-court.
34. Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
596, 601 (2003).
35. Id.
36. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEG. ST. 1, 36
(2004) (It was estimated that due to the state of the Rwandan judicial system at the time it would
take the formal system more than a century to judge the cases of genocidaires.).
37. RULE OF LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (United Nations, New York
& Geneva 2006).
38. Id.
39. Teitel, supra note 7, at 78.
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One vitally important element of TRC is its limited mandate. 40
Amnesties can only be offered for crimes that fit within particular
temporal and subject matter limitations. For example, such limitations
existed in post-Apartheid South Africa’s TRC, where the mandate only
allowed for amnesties for “political crimes” and they must have taken
place during the apartheid era.41 Without such jurisdictional limitations,
it would be possible for ordinary criminals to take advantage of such a
system’s existence, both destroying the public confidence and legitimacy
and vastly decreasing the efficiency of such a system.
The final type of transitional justice mechanism of interest here
gained international notoriety in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. In
this particular occasion, a historical dispute settlement mechanism that
had been used for settling land disputes was adapted to adjudicate the
crimes of the genocidaires. 42 While many elements of the traditional
Gacaca would change, the main goals were the adaptation of a system
involving community involvement that would be accessible to all. 43
While the system was not without valid criticisms that will be discussed
in great detail below, it was an early attempt at the incorporation of
tradition and local norms into the adjudication process.44
III. PROBLEMS WITH PREVIOUS MECHANISMS
The problems of previous transitional justice mechanisms can be
grouped broadly into four categories. By examining the various issues
categorically as opposed to going through each mechanism individually
and discussing its problems it will be far easier to craft a hypothetical
framework that will avoid such pitfalls.
There have been broad categories of complaints against previous
mechanisms. The first category that will be discussed is the imposed
nature of such mechanisms. Often the international funding and
attention that post-atrocity states attract tends to cause the international
community to decide the best domestic policy. 45 This has created
problems throughout the history of transitional justice. The second issue
40. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16
HUM. R. Q. 597, 636-639 (1994).
41. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, art. 3(3) (S.Afr.).
42. Christine M. Venter, Eliminating Fear Through Recreating Community Courts in
Rwanda: The Role of the Gacaca Courts, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 577, 578 (2007).
43. Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute Resolution
Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPPERDINE DISP. RES. L. J. 1, 34 (2012).
44. Venter, supra note 42, at 578.
45. Barbara Oomen, Donor Driven Justice and its Discontents, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887, 895
(2005) [hereinafter Oomen, Donor Driven Justice].
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has been a lack of respect for international human rights norms and the
international law of fair trials.46 This problem is of particular
importance for the purpose of this article. The third category that will be
discussed is an all-important transitional justice failure. While processes
are meant to allow a state to move on and come together after atrocities,
certain mechanisms have been accused of failing at this critical goal.47
The fourth and final category that has been a tremendous criticism of
transitional justice mechanisms is extraordinary inefficiency. 48 This is
mainly a procedural issue, however its significant impact on substantive
progress and processes has led to it being a constant complaint of nearly
every historical mechanism.
A.

Imposed Justice

As has been mentioned previously in the article, there are varied,
and often competing, goals of transitional justice.49 While some parties
and mechanisms may place high value on retribution, others may focus
on restoration. 50 This particular difference is readily apparent, and
immensely problematic, when the international community involves
itself in post-atrocity justice, whether through financing, technical
assistance or any other form. 51
One such prominent example is in the period of transition and
rebuilding following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 52 In the period
immediately following the genocide, an ashamed international
community began entering the Central African nation in droves.53
Barbara Oomen observes that in the period after the genocide,
tremendous increases were seen both in internationally funded projects
(an increase from zero to thirty-five) and in expenditures (an increase
from $0 to over $30 million U.S.). 54
This type of international funding and interest does not come
without political strings. In the case of Rwanda, the international
community saw the country as somewhat of a justice laboratory,
46. Christopher Le Mon, Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 NO. 2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16,
16 (Winter 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/2lemon.pdf?rd=1.
47. See generally JON ELSTER, RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY (2006).
48. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 902.
49. See SG Report 2004, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 895.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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examining different types of transitional justice to see how well they
could work. 55 The international community also seemed to favor a TRC,
similar to the one that was used in post-apartheid South Africa, while the
Rwandan government had considerable suspicions of an independent
body with the power to grant pardons to those who committed acts of
genocide. 56
The government ended up creating a watered-down version of the
TRC, which would not have the power to grant pardons. 57 By
effectively hamstringing the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission, the body ended up as merely a forum for grievances that
turned a blind eye to many of the genocide’s root causes. 58 In this way,
the Commission was an attempt to appease the international community
by creating a body similar to the South African TRC. However, because
it was based on the fears and desires of domestic authorities, it removed
one of the most important elements of such a mechanism. 59 Such an
example is telling in the relationship between the international
community and the host country. While Rwanda had no interest in such
a body, international donors expected one, thus forcing the creation of a
body that proved powerless and wasted both time and finite resources.60
Put broadly, a major problem of international justice has been the
differing interests and goals of the international community, which
provides much of the funding and expertise for such justice mechanisms,
and domestic authorities, who have differing (and often competing)
goals. 61 Predictably, this complicates the process tremendously. While
the international donors must be appeased in order to continue the flow
of vital aid, both financial and technical, true reconciliation cannot occur
without the input and decision making of local leaders and populations.
These competing interests create an air of imposed decisions and
imposed justice. While the full importance of local ownership will be
discussed later, this fracture is an important criticism of historical
transitional justice mechanisms. 62
55. Id. at 897.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 897-899.
58. See generally Janine Natalya Clark, National Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda: A
Flawed Approach?, 28 J. CONT. AFR. ST. 137 (2010).
59. BARBARA OOMEN, JUSTICE MECHANISMS AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY: THE
EXAMPLE OF RWANDA’S MULTI-LAYERED JUSTICE MECHANISMS 12 (2007), available at
http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Dealing_with_the_Past/Resources/
Oomen__Barbara__Rwanda.pdf [hereinafter Oomen, Justice Mechanisms].
60. Id.
61. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 897-898.
62. See generally Jens Narten, Dilemmas of Promoting “Local Ownership,” in THE
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International Human Rights

The second criticism takes place in situations where the
international community is less involved. Often when post-atrocity
states develop their own mechanisms for transitional justice, they do not
adhere to internationally recognized fair trial norms and international
human rights law. 63 Instead, such states often devise systems that value
efficiency, expediency, and familiarity over what would be acceptable
under international human rights law. 64 Just as above, the greatest
example of this failure existed in the period of post-genocide transition
in Rwanda. 65
The Rwandan transitional justice system went through many
The initial plan was to prosecute those most
modifications. 66
responsible for the genocide in the ICTR, while the minor participants
would be tried in Rwandan domestic courts. 67 For a variety of reasons,
this plan was doomed. Among the primary reasons were inefficiency
and lack of capacity, issues that will be discussed later. 68 As an answer
to this problem, the international community, along with Rwandan
authorities, came up with the idea of the Gacaca. 69 In the Gacaca
courts, a traditional dispute settlement mechanism was adopted in an
effort to expedite the process of genocide adjudication as well as battle
the problem of imposed justice discussed above. 70
In the adaptation of the Gacaca for genocide adjudication, much
was left to be desired from the standpoint of an international human
rights lawyer. 71 A few examples of the plethora of such criticisms were
the lack of access to counsel and inability to produce evidence in
defense, the incredibly quick speed of decision-making and the inability
to have a fair and impartial tribunal.72 During the process it was not
uncommon for defendants to appear alone before a Gacaca tribunal for
mere minutes and be sentenced to long prison sentences. 73 The open

DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE
OPERATIONS 252 (2009).
63. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity, supra note 6, at 11.
69. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra, note 45, at 894-899.
70. Id.
71. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
72. Id.
73. Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in
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format that was so heralded also allowed for high levels of bribery and
intimidation of both witnesses and community judges.74
The issues in such traditional systems historically helped bring
about the system of international fair trial rights. As the trial system
grew, the formality grew along with it. Thus, using traditional systems
can often be problematic from a human rights standpoint unless they are
adapted to incorporate international fair trial norms. This incorporation
was not done well in Rwanda, and has been a constant criticism of
international lawyers and academics.75
C.

Failure to Move Forward

The final substantive complaint against transitional justice
mechanisms is that such mechanisms have not allowed for the necessary
reconciliation.76 The widespread nature of the problem makes it
particularly difficult to deal with. I will use this section as an attempt to
briefly explain why, in each particular situation, there have been
complaints of a failure to move forward in reconciliation.
First, in the event of formal trials, along with those trials that
incorporate local norms, there have been constant complaints of victor’s
justice. 77 That is, there has been an invariable allegation that those who
are punished for crimes committed are merely those that committed
crimes on the losing side of the conflict. 78 This has been particularly
prevalent in the case of civil wars and transitions from despotic
regimes. 79 Often times the state will have problems reconciling due to
lingering bitterness that exists among groups who feel they have been
unjustly targeted for retribution, while those on the victorious side
committed similar atrocities and go unpunished.80
Post-genocide Rwanda exemplifies this difficult issue. 81 During

Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 147 (Spring 2008).
74. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 17.
75. Id.
76. SG Report 2004, supra note 18, at Par. 8.
77. See generally James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CON. RES. 140 (2003); Ralph
Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541 (2004);
Randall T. Coyne, Escaping Victor’s Justice by the use of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,
58 OK. L. REV. 11 (2005).
78. See Coyne, supra note 78.
79. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473, 483 (1999).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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that time, genocide was primarily perpetrated by members of the Hutu
ethnic group against the Tutsis.82 The slaughter of Tutsis was not
stopped until current President Paul Kagame and his largely Tutsi
Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) were able to capture the capital and
stem the violence. From that time through the present, Kagame and
other Tutsis have dominated the Rwandan government. 83 This has
meant that in the period immediately following the genocide all the way
through today, there have been accusations of hesitancy to investigate
the crimes of the RPF and other Tutsis. 84 Predictably, many Hutus are
sent to jail for crimes committed that they believe were mirrored in form
and brutality by the RPF. This has fostered tremendous bitterness
between the two ethnic groups and halted the country’s progress towards
reconciliation. 85
TRCs and other forms of amnesty can often present the exact
opposite problem. 86 A victorious side demands revenge over the
brutalities of the cast off despot or vanquished foe. When a TRC is
convened or an amnesty is offered, the winning side can become
embittered and unwilling to reconcile with its former oppressors.87
Blanket amnesties present an obvious problem in that they are simply a
promise not to achieve retribution against those who have perpetrated
atrocity. TRCs, however, present a unique dichotomy that can be
particularly difficult for victors who seek retribution and vengeance to
tolerate. 88
It is a unique difficulty of the TRC process that the greater crimes
one explains and admits to, the less penalties the individual will face.89
82. Id.
83. Rwanda Genocide: Kagame ‘cleared of Habyarimana crash’, BBC (Jan. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16472013.
84. See generally Wippman, supra note 79, at 483; see also Victor Peskin, Investigating
Rwandan Patriotic Front Atrocities and the Politics of Bearing Witness, in INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE
COOPERATION 186 (2008).
85. See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in
Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with
the Genocide, 45 J. AFR. L. 143 (2001).
86. See generally Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in
South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1074 (2002).
87. Id.
88. For more information on amnesties and the issues surrounding them, see generally
LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: BRIDGING THE
PEACE AND JUSTICE DIVIDE (2008).
89. ROSALIND SHAW, UNITED STATES INST. FOR PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE, SPECIAL REPORT 6-7 (2005),
available
at
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For example, a person who spent his life in a government security force
may have committed hundreds of horrific acts in defense of the regime,
and if he is unwilling to admit to many of those acts, he may face
punishment. However, if he admit to all of them and gives details on
each horrible act, he may be given amnesty. 90 Thus, the greater the
crimes admitted to, the more likely one can spend the rest of his days in
his own home. In the case of South Africa, this infuriated the families of
many victims of the apartheid regime. It has even been said that those
who were victims of the apartheid regime were “robbed . . . of their right
to justice.” 91 This belief has fostered a similar level of bitterness in
other post-atrocity states acquainted with the TRC. 92
The failure of reconciliation problem thus exists in both extremes.
On one hand, when there are formal prosecutions and trials it feels as
though only those that lost the conflict are being punished. On the other
hand, when no one is punished or a TRC is used, the victors often
harvest feelings of resentment for missing their chance at retribution for
years of oppression and brutality. These problems have existed in
transitional justice throughout its modern history. 93
D.

Efficiency

Finally, many transitional justice mechanisms have been woefully
inefficient.94 While this is primarily a procedural issue, it can often have
substantive effects. A state that is still in the process of adjudicating an
atrocity is forced to live under the shadow of its worst moments for
many years after the atrocity is over. There are a few primary reasons
for the inefficiency within transitional justice mechanisms.
First, and perhaps most importantly, often states undergoing a
period of transition lack the judicial capacity for the amount of work
necessary. 95 This includes a lack of infrastructure as well as manpower.

http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/4625/1/Rethinking%20Truth%20and%20Re
conciliation%20Commissions%20Lessons%20from%20Sierra%20Leone.pdf?1.
90. Id.
91. Apartheid enforcer sticks to ‘farcical’ story on Biko killing, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 11,
1997), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/apartheid-enforcer-sticks-to-farcical-storyon-biko-killing-1238495.html.
92. Shaw, supra note 89, at 7.
93. Id.
94. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006).
95. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo De Greiff, Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public
Employees in Transitional Societies, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 80-120 (2007)
(discussing various societies in post-atrocity periods of transition and the difficulties in finding
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Often states undergoing an atrocity experience an extraordinary “brain
drain.” 96 This can happen either of two ways. When there is a shortterm atrocity such as the Rwandan genocide, many of the professionals
important to the transitional process either flee or are killed during the
upheaval. 97 By some estimates, immediately after the genocide, there
remained ten lawyers in the entire country. 98
The second potential brain drain exists during a long-term
tyrannical regime. Often, in an attempt to solidify its hold on power, a
regime will allow only powerful insiders to take up positions of
importance. This includes those in the justice department. As a result,
over a period of years, the only people who remain qualified to fulfill
these important functions are powerful members of a tyrannical
regime. 99 Once that regime is deposed, no one within the country
remains able to adequately fulfill the functions other than the members
of the former regime, an often-unacceptable solution for those who cast
them from power.
This lack of capacity and “brain drain” forces the state to ask for
the assistance of the international community. 100 Once the international
community is involved there are often many other forms of
inefficiencies including repetition, lack of coordination, and general lack
of expediency. 101 The ICTR to date has completed only sixty-five cases
since 1994. 102 It is, however, important to note that because efficiency is
a procedural issue with many more non-legal concerns than the
previously discussed substantive issues, the various solutions for
inefficiency go well beyond the purview of this paper.
This brief synopsis of the problems associated with previous
transitional justice mechanisms is useful in determining what must be
avoided when crafting a mechanism that will be useful in the future.
The populace must not be made to feel as though an outside definition of
justice and reconciliation is being imposed on them from a faceless

competent public employees).
96. Id.
97. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. L. ST. 29, 34 (2004).
98. Id.
99. For a broader discussion of the difficulties associated with the banishment of regime
insiders from governance and the subsequent lack of qualified individuals, see generally David
Roman, From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political Effects, 41 GOV. &
OPPOSITION 347 (2006).
100. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice supra note 45, at 894-899.
101. Id.
CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL
FOR
RWANDA,
102. Status
of
Cases,
INT’L
http://unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
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international community with no accountability. 103 In an effort to ensure
that this is not the case, many methods have been attempted. One of the
most discussed solutions to this problem is the inclusion of various
forms of local ownership. As discussed above, the possibility of using a
traditional form from the transitioning state took hold in Rwanda.104
The traditional form of the Gacaca is important as a remedy to two
of the major problems discussed above. First, adapting the traditional
Rwandan dispute mechanism was an attempt to remedy the imposed
nature of many transitional justice mechanisms brought about by the
international community. 105 Linked to this was the attempt to use the
Gacaca popular participation to foster reconciliation, something that has
been a problem in many past mechanisms. 106
However, the Rwandan Gacaca failed in several important
international fair trial elements.107 While the Gacaca form and popular
participation of Rwandans allowed for true local ownership and thus had
great potential for reconciliation going forward, a trial that is
fundamentally unfair cannot achieve justice and is thus inherently
unacceptable. 108 In order to attempt to rectify this important and
fundamental conflict tradition and the ever-evolving international
standards of a fair trial, we must first discuss what elements are
necessary to make a trial “fair” by international human rights standards.
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FAIR
TRIAL?
Fair trial rights are among the most important, if not the most
important, rights in the entire body of international human rights law.
For that reason, it is exceptionally well developed in both international
and regional documents and case law.
The right to a fair trial is expressly guaranteed in nearly every
general international human rights document including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and others.109 The right is also
103. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899.
104. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
105. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 894-899.
106. Id.
107. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
108. For a general discussion of why trials must be fair, see generally Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. R. 1175 (1989).
109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, Dec. 10, 1948, [hereinafter UDHR];
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, pt. 1-7, Dec. 19, 1966 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
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guaranteed in regional documents such as the American Convention on
Human Rights (“ACHR”), the Banjul Charter, and the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 110 Fair trials are so important
in international law that the Fourth Geneva Convention requires them
even in times of armed conflict. 111 The right is so indispensable that
even while many other fundamental rights may be derogated from, a fair
trial is still required by international law.112
While there are minor differences between the fair trial rights
promised in the various documents mentioned above, they have been
interpreted in similar manners without much regard to the source,
creating a relatively universal body of international fair trial law.113
International Criminal Court Justice Stefan Trechsel notes that the
universally recognized right to a fair trial can further be broken down
into eight separate categories. These categories include an independent
and impartial tribunal, a public trial, the right to a speedy trial, the
presumption of innocence (which includes the freedom from self
incrimination), the right to counsel, the right to present both evidence
and arguments in defense of the accusations and to challenge the
prosecution’s evidence and arguments, the right to be informed of all
charges, and finally, the right to “some form of appeal.” 114
It is the purpose of this article to discuss which of these rights
cannot be altered in any way and which of them can be used as areas to
insert local ownership and traditional norms while still maintaining the
all important compliance with international human rights law. In order
to do this, the individual rights Justice Trechsel lists above will be split
into two categories, those involving the form and function of the tribunal
and those involving the treatment of the defendant.115
The belief of this author is that local ownership and traditional
norms can be inserted into those involving the form and function of the
tribunal, so long as the rights involving the treatment of the defendant
are left unaltered. While there are a variety of reasons that individual
fair trial rights cannot be harmed, the simple reason is that those rights
pertaining to the treatment of the defendant are too narrow and personal,
while those concerning the form and function of the tribunal have a
110. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, art. 7, June 7, 1981; American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July
18, 1978 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6 [hereinafter ECHR].
111. Fourth Geneva Contention, art. 5, Aug 12, 1949.
112. Stefan Trechsel, Why must trials be fair?, 31 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 94, 95 (1997).
113. See generally Ian Langford, Fair Trial: The History of an Idea, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2009).
114. Id. (note: the right to appeal will not be discussed in the framework section).
115. See infra notes 143-144 and 145-149 and accompanying text.
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much broader range that allows for both cosmopolitan and substantive
alterations.
A.

Defendant Treatment Rights

This fair trial sketch will begin with the defendant treatment
category of Justice Trechsel’s fair trial rights listed above. This category
will include the presumption of innocence, which includes the freedom
from self-incrimination; the right to counsel; the right of a defendant to
present their own evidence and arguments as well as challenge those
presented by the prosecution; and the right to be informed of all charges.
This section will include a brief discussion of each such right and an
explanation as to why it is not an area where local ownership and
traditional norms can be inserted alongside the international fair trial
right.
The first right to be discussed is the presumption of innocence.
Briefly, this right is codified in many international legal documents
beginning with article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 116 In addition to merely guaranteeing that an individual remains
innocent until proven guilty, this fair trial right grants protection against
self-incrimination, a fundamental tenet of the presumption of innocence.
The second right under the broad category of defendant treatment
rights is the guarantee that the defendant be allowed to present evidence
and arguments in his or her defense as well as challenge evidence and
arguments presented by the prosecution. Similar to the presumption of
innocence, a broad range of international human rights documents
guarantee this right. While it is not specifically mentioned by the
UDHR, it is enumerated within article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR. 117
The defendant’s right to information is the third right included
within this category. Similar to the right to present and refute evidence
and arguments, this right is guaranteed by article 14(3)(a) of the
ICCPR. 118
Of Justice Trechsel’s categories of generally accepted fair trial
rights, the final that will be included within this category is the
defendant’s right to counsel. Such a right is also guaranteed by the
ICCPR, article 14(3)(d). 119 For the purposes of this fair trial framework,

116.
117.
118.
119.

UDHR, supra note 110, at art. 11.
ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(e).
ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(a).
ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 14(3)(d).
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there are two important inclusions in the right to a counsel. 120 First, the
defendant is given a choice of counsel according to, not only the ICCPR,
but also the Banjul Charter, the ECHR, and the ACHR. 121 Second, the
Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the ICCPR, has determined
that defendants should be given a choice of counsel that will act “in
accordance with their established professional standards and judgment
(sic) without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue
interference . . . .” 122
The reason why these fair trial rights cannot be altered through
local tradition is twofold. For the first three rights discussed, the
categorization is a matter of the broad interpretation of the right and the
restrictiveness of the surrounding policy space. That is, the grey area
that exists within many of the tribunal form rights discussed below is
simply not present.
Simply put, an individual is either presumed innocent at all phases
of the trial or they are not.123 If at any point that right has been altered or
distorted, then the right has been violated and the trial has run afoul of
the broad body of international human rights law. 124 The expansive
application of this the right to be presumed innocent right has been
upheld repeatedly by various international courts.125 In one example, the
ECHR held that a pre-trial public statement by a prosecutor that the
police had found the murderer constituted an unlawful rebuke of the
presumption of innocence.126 This level of fortitude and inflexibility has
become commonplace.127
The same is true for the right of the accused to present and refute
evidence and arguments. If the accused, within the confines of evidence
and trial law, is not allowed to present and refute evidence and

120. Id.
121. ICCPR, supra note 110, 14(3)(b), Banjul Charter, supra note 111, at art. 7, ACHR, supra
note 111, at art. 8(2)(d), ECHR, supra note 111, at art. 6(3)(c).
122. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 13:
EQUALITY BEFORE THE COURTS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND PUBLIC HEARING BY AN
INDEPENDENT COURT ESTABLISHED BY LAW 13(9) (Apr. 13, 1984), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd?Opendo
cument.
123. See generally Stefan Trechsel & Sarah Summers, The Right to be Presumed Innocent, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2006).
124. Id.
125. See generally Andrew Stumer, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: EVIDENTIAL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE (2010).
126. Paul Mahoney, Right to a Fair Trial under Article 6 E.C.H.R., 4 JUD. ST. INST. J. 107,
121 (2004).
127. Id.
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arguments, their rights have been violated. The same is true with the
right to be informed of charges. In order for these rights to be respected,
they cannot be altered in any meaningful way.
The fourth right, to be represented by counsel, does not share the
same stringent application that the first three rights did.128 There are
ways that could be envisioned where the defendant’s right to be
represented by counsel is respected to the letter of international human
rights law that also include local tradition or norms, however, the
seriousness of the potential punishment for crimes in a transitional
context requires that all potential conflicts be resolved in favor of the
accused. 129
One hypothetical situation would be the adaptation of a traditional
method of dispute settlement that allowed for village elders to represent
sides. In a transitional justice adaptation, that could include the
assignment of village elders to defendants. According to the letter of the
ICCPR, that would be granting counsel to the accused. If some choice
were given, that could also satisfy the requirement that the defendant be
given a choice of counsel. However, as the Human Rights Committee
has determined, it is not only necessary that the defendant be able to
choose his or her own counsel, but that counsel be able to perform to
“their established professional standards . . . .” 130
While the requirement is not, on its face, perfectly clear, it is likely
that the Human Rights Committee would require the established
professional standards of the Counsel to be those of the legal
profession. 131 In short, the Human Rights Committee would probably
require the professional standards brought by Counsel be those of the
standard profession of a counselor. 132
The Human Rights Committee has also found that the seriousness
of the potential punishment must be taken into account when
determining the extent of a right to counsel. For example, in the case of
Francisco Juan Larrañaga v. The Philippines, it was held that a
defendant’s right to counsel was violated when his request for
adjournment to find and hire another counsel was denied after his
original lawyer was arrested for contempt of court.133 The Committee

128. See supra text accompanying notes 123-127.
129. Larranaga v. Philippines, Comm. 1421/2005, U.N. Doc. A/61/40, Vol. II, at 406, par. 7.6
(HRC 2006).
130. Mahoney, supra note 126, at 121.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Larrañaga, par. 2.5, 2.6.
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noted that since Mr. Larrañaga was facing the death penalty, a
significant amount of leeway must be afforded him, even if it causes a
In transitional justice mechanisms, the potential
trial delay. 134
punishments are far ranging and include capital punishment, life in
prison, and other significant periods of incarceration. 135 Due to the
seriousness of these potential punishments, the right to counsel must be
viewed broadly in favor of the accused.136
It can be argued that much of the development of international
human rights law pertains to mainly formalist legal systems through
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and the ECHR. 137 This is
precisely the argument made by proponents of the Rwandan Gacaca.
Advocates argued that because there were no prosecuting attorneys and
the Judges did the primary questioning, along with an absence of
complex rules of procedure that would hurt the defendant, this was
tantamount to a fair trial.138 This view is simply unacceptable. As
discussed above, the Human Rights Committee and other human rights
bodies have given significant weight to the ability of the accused to have
legal counsel. 139
In contrast, however, it is important to note that the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, undoubtedly schooled in
such informal tribunals, has cast a similarly broad interpretation of the
right to counsel. In its “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa,” the Commission states that
accused parties have a right to legal assistance when the “interests of
justice require” and, further, that said interests should be determined in
criminal cases by the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the
potential sentence.140 While complexity of the case and the ability of the
accused to represent themselves comes into play in civil matters, it is
irrelevant in criminal matters.141 In the Gacaca, defendants were facing
serious charges and potential sentences that were substantial enough for
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 7.6.
Sosnov, supra note 73, at 121.
Larrañaga, par. 7.6.
See generally John G. Merrills, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1993).
138. L Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda,
26 B.C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 385, 410 (2003).
139. Larrañaga, par. 7.6.
140. AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
ON THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA H(B), available at
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/ACHPR_Principles&Guidelines_FairTrial.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3. 2013).
141. Id.
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the interests of justice to require the right to an attorney. 142
With these things in mind, any transitional justice mechanism that
would be in line with international fair trial norms must leave the
defendant treatment rights untouched. In any such mechanism, the
defendant must be presumed innocent at all stages of the trial, including
the interrogation where he or she must be free from self-incrimination.
The accused must be allowed to defend himself against all accusations
and evidence, while being allowed to present both on his own behalf.
The defendant must be accused of all charges against him and finally, he
must be given access to a counsel of his choosing that is in line with the
“established professional standards” of the legal profession. Any
deviation from these specific defendant treatment elements would make
a trial in violation of international fair trial rights.
B.

Tribunal Form Rights

The second category, and that which is considerably more relevant
for this article, is the fair trial rights concerning the form and function of
the tribunal. Of the rights espoused by Justice Trechsel, this will include
that the tribunal be both independent and impartial and that the trial be
speedy and public. 143 It is important to note that while these rights are
not inferior to those of the defendant’s treatment listed above, they are
considerably more flexible.144 This will allow for the insertion of local
and traditional norms into the tribunal form. Just as above, this section
will include a brief explanation of each tribunal form right and an
explanation as to why the right is flexible enough for the necessary
inclusions.
It is possible that there is no more important fair trial right than the
right of the accused to an independent and impartial tribunal. 145 This
right ensures that the judiciary is not responsible to any of the other
branches of government, so that it can make its own decisions about the
legality of the charges against an individual, his or her guilt or innocence
and the validity of all other aspects of the trial. 146 The Human Rights
Committee has discussed tribunal independence and impartiality with
particular reference to the following factors: manner and qualifications
142. Organic Law, Law No. 40 of 2000, art. 68 (Rwanda) (the Gacaca law allows for
punishments up to and including capital punishment or life imprisonment).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 147-155.
144. See infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
145. Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal
Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2005).
146. Id.
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for appointment; the experience while serving as justices, including the
term duration and their promotion; transfer and removal; and actual
independence. 147
It is important, however, for the purposes of this article, to
recognize that the Human Rights Committee has recognized periods
where derogation from the strict independent and impartiality
requirement is possible. In the comments this refers to both military and
“special” courts that are required by “exigencies of the actual
situation.” 148
Similar flexibility is present in the Committee’s general thoughts on
the publicity of trials. While the group believes that it is “an important
safeguard in the interest of the individual and of society at large,” 149 it is
readily acknowledged that there are situations where this right must be
altered. The ICCPR itself acknowledges a number of such exceptions,
including a catch-all provision that allows the exclusion of the public
“where publicity would prejudice the interest of justice.” 150
The final right within this category is the right to a speedy trial. In
the language of the ICCPR, this is the right to be tried without undue
delay. 151 Regional human rights treaties, including the Banjul Charter,
the ECHR, and the ACHR alter the language to require that individuals
accused of crimes be tried within a “reasonable time.” 152
In either framing, this right has been interpreted to have a dual
requirement. The first is that the individual not be tried so quickly as to
restrict their ability to construct a defense.153 If an individual were
arrested and immediately brought before a judge for trial, they would not
have had adequate time to construct a defense, consult with an attorney,
call and consult witnesses, or review evidence, thus rendering all of the
other rights irrelevant. The second prong of the speedy trial requirement
is that the accused not be forced to wait an unreasonable time for their
trial. 154 This is the more obvious element, as an individual who has been
147. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 122, at par. 3
148. Id. at par. 4 (note: The Committee envisions such scenarios only for states of emergency
as contemplated by article 4 of the ICCPR. The circumstances of such a public emergency are
unimportant for this particular article. It is simply necessary to understand that the Committee has
acknowledged that in extraordinary circumstances there is a small level of flexibility surrounding
the Independent and Impartial requirement.).
149. Id. at par. 5.
150. ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 14(1).
151. ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 14(3)(c).
152. Banjul Charter, supra note 111, at art. 7(1), ECHR, supra note 111, at art. 5.3, ACHR,
supra note 111, at art. 7.5.
153. Mahoney, supra note 126, at 109.
154. Id. at 119-120.
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held for years on a charge without trial has already been punished and
thus a verdict is immaterial.155
The flexibility of this right is clear. There is no hard line
requirement in international law that a trial must occur after a certain
number of days. It is simply a guide; the trial must be held in a
reasonable time. This broad flexibility has been demonstrated in
international holdings, with the ECHR allowing delays up to and
including nearly thirteen years depending on the complexity of the case
and other individual circumstances.156
The bonding element of these three rights is the flexibility that
international human rights law has written into their application.157 The
same is true for the public order exception to trial publicity. While
declaring a public emergency may not be necessary or in the interest of
the state, it is important that the crafters of international law understood
the difficulties and necessities that may exist during certain periods in
the duration of a regime. 158 During post-atrocity periods, it is necessary
that the flexibility of such rights be used in an effort to succeed in all of
the goals of transitional justice discussed above, not merely to seek
retribution or restitution as is so often the case for standard domestic
criminal court systems. 159
This breakdown of fair trial rights leaves us with a delineation that
is useful for the insertion of local norms and traditions into transitional
justice mechanisms. While the first category of fair trial rights, those
that concern the treatment of the defendant at and before trial, do not
have a grey area that can be used for procedural and substantive
changes, the latter rights have such flexibility. These tribunal form and
function rights allow enough flexibility that local norms and traditions
may be inserted in a meaningful way, giving the local populace control
over significant procedural and substantive elements of the transition of
their country.

155. See generally Mahoney, supra note 126.
156. Ikon Industriële konsulenten in marketing-management B.V.& Martin v. The
Netherlands, 485 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (1992) (accepted a period of twelve years and ten months).
157. It is important to note that while it is not the purpose of this article to claim that all
transitional justice situations should be viewed in the same category as public emergencies that
allow for derogation as envisioned by article 4 of the ICCPR and similar provisions in the ACHR
and ECHR, it is important to the article that such provisions exist.
158. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 122, at par. 4.
159. Geetanjali Mukherjee, Achieving Reconciliation through Prosecution in the Courts:
Lessons from Rwanda, 28 CONFLICT RES. QUART. 331, 334 (2011).
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V. LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND TRIBUNAL FORM RIGHTS
This section of the article will serve two purposes. First, it will act
as an area where the tribunal form and function rights discussed above
will be paired with hypothetical local tradition and norms. While this
may seem like a fool’s errand, it is important to point out specific ways
in which traditional dispute settlement mechanisms may be incorporated
into the hypothetical transitional justice mechanism, that both integrates
local ownership and respects international fair trial rights. The second
part of this section will conclude the article in an effort to recap all of the
crucial elements, as well as things to avoid, of a transitional justice
mechanism that both respects international human rights norms and
incorporates local traditions and norms. This section will also include a
method by which such a framework can be incorporated into individual
transitional justice mechanisms.
A.

Hypothetical Inclusion

This section will serve to examine the rights that were determined
to have relative flexibility above in the context of how local traditions
and norms may be included within their wide umbrellas.
The requirement that tribunals be independent and impartial is
perhaps the most important tribunal requirement of any of the fair trial
rights. 160 In spite of, or perhaps because of, its importance, it has been
one of the most difficult requirements for judicial systems throughout
the globe to maintain. 161 Independent and impartial judiciaries have
been of particular concern in the developing world due to, among other
things, a lack of capacity and strength in central government. 162 Postatrocity states implementing transitional justice schemes have many of
the same problems. 163 As discussed above, the solution to this problem
for many transitional states has been to include high levels of
international participation. 164
Thus, the flexibility within the right to an independent and impartial
tribunal has a twofold importance. First, it allows for the insertion of
160. See generally Rep. of U.N. Con. of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 24th Sess.,
Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/REV.1 (1985).
161. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 SO. CAL. L. REV. 353, 364 (1998).
162. See generally Yash Vyas, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Third World Perspective,
11 THIRD WORLD L. ST. 127 (1992).
163. Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of Problems and
the Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 9 (2005).
164. Oomen, Donor Driven Justice, supra note 45, at 897.
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local norms and traditions. Second, it removes some of the muchmaligned international influence that can sometimes have conflicting
goals and creates the appearance of imposed justice.
The flexibility of an independent and impartial tribunal does not,
however, insinuate that a tribunal needn’t be independent and
impartial. 165 It merely means that there is some leeway in the creation
and application of this particular right that allows for the insertion of
local traditions and local ownership.
Take an example of a society where community is extremely
important to individual being and traditional dispute settlement
mechanisms. 166 Often, such community-based mechanisms have a
strong focus on both mediation and conciliation. For example, Fiji has a
traditional dispute resolution mechanism that has been adapted for use in
modern civil disagreements. Under the mechanism, it is common for the
offending party to apologize and be conciliatory to the offended party.
If this apology is not accepted, the help of a third party mediator is
sought. This mediator must be agreeable to both parties and is
responsible for judging the sincerity and acceptability of the apology. If
it is determined to be acceptable and is still not accepted by the offended
party, that party becomes socially ostracized. In the Fijian system, even
merely for civil disputes, this mediation was created to foster greater
social and communal cohesion, an important goal of transitional
justice. 167
The difficulty in incorporating such a system into various elements
of transitional justice mechanisms would not be high. For instance, a
TRC could be developed where it was the responsibility of the offending
party to tell their story and apologize to the aggrieved parties or their
families. A third party mediator, who was determined to be acceptable
by the whole of society, presumably through republican selection, could
then be asked to determine the sincerity of the apology to determine an
acceptable punishment. The third party or a third party commission
could also be asked to determine the validity of the story, using external

165.
166.

Ferejohn, supra note 62, at 364.
See generally Roger MacGinty, Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace, 43
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 139 (2008) (describes the importance of reconciliation and community
in various case studies including the Acholi in Northern Uganda, the Nasa tribe in Colombia and the
Rwandan Gacaca courts).
167. RATU FILIMONE RALOGAIVAU, UNIV. OF THE S. PAC., BLENDING TRADITIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN FIJI WITH THE RULE OF LAW—THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS (2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/BlendingTradDisputeReswithRo
L.pdf.
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evidence, such as the case with the South African TRC. 168
This type of community-based mediation could also be used in the
sentencing stage of a formal trial or a mechanism with like powers. This
has already been attempted in Australian criminal courts for indigenous
defendants. In a transitional justice mechanism, the defendant could be
given the opportunity to apologize to the victim or victim’s family and
tell his or her story. If a third party mediator believes its sincerity, the
sentence could be reduced or changed to something constructive for the
community. The goal of the Australian court system is to make for a
more meaningful punishment, one that contributes to social cohesion and
society in addition to retribution rather than solely retributive justice. 169
The commonality between these two examples and the South
African TRC does illustrate a tremendous problem discussed above with
the TRC. 170 That is, the greater the evils committed and admitted to by
the defendant, the more they have a potential for a reduced sentence.171
The important difference is that the above examples exist in addition to
formal trials or TRC’s, and are not sole mechanisms. The potential for
lesser punishment based on communal apology is an adaptation of
traditional mechanisms that have been used to foster community and
build society for generations. 172 An individual who goes to a TRC to tell
their story and apologize with utmost sincerity, who then is forced to
perform services that help rebuild a post-atrocity state, is considerably
different than one who goes to a TRC to simply tell a story and is given
an amnesty for his or her crimes based on that story. The apology and
the punishment could make a considerable difference to victims and
their advocates. 173
The same is true for the difference between the use of an apology
and mediation in the sentencing phase of a trial. While it may be that a
reduced sentence is available, it would be for a traditional mediator to
determine the sincerity of the apology and determine whether or not that
allows them a commutation of retributive punishment into a constructive
punishment. Such a system has been valued in traditional societies with
strong senses of community for many years; it is worthwhile to
168. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, 4(f) (S.Afr.).
169. Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and Justice Practices in Australia,
in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 261-280, available at
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/261-280/tandi277/view%20paper.html.
170. Shaw, supra note 89, at 7.
171. Id.
172. See generally MacGinty, supra note 166.
173. James Gibson, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the fairness of Amnesty in
South Africa, 46 AM. POL. SCI. R. 540, 540 (2002).
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incorporate such traditions into transitional justice mechanisms. 174
The question may be posed: how does this differ from a standard
conception of the independent and impartial tribunal? While these are
clearly different than traditional western forms of adjudication, that does
not mean they are different than the independent and impartial tribunal
envisioned in international human rights law. While the fair trial rights
regarding defendant treatment are inviolable and unchangeable, there is
some flexibility in rights concerning the tribunal form. 175 While the
examples above may differ from the ICTY and ICTR, set up in the wake
of atrocities by the international community, they have many of the same
powers but incorporate a form that has been used in community based
societies for generations. 176
Similar flexibility is possible in the publicity and speed of trials.
While these may seem to be minutiae in the wider array of fair trials,
they are very important elements to consider when discussing tradition
or local norms based dispute settlement mechanisms in transitional
justice. 177
There are two extremely different situations where publicity may be
of extreme concern when creating transitional justice mechanisms based
on traditional norms and local ownership. The first is in the case of a
TRC. 178 The latter is in the event of a trial-like dispute resolution
apparatus based on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. 179
Consider publicity in a standard form TRC. Among the previously
stated goals of a TRC is to create a historical record of the crimes
committed during the atrocity period. 180 While the conditional amnesty
may serve to induce many to come forward and admit to their crimes,
the public shaming that comes from admission of such horrific acts
could serve to negate any such inducement.181 This would be
particularly true when the temporal mandate of such a TRC is broad
enough that many crimes were committed in the distant past, making
their prosecution extremely unlikely. 182 Any significant reason not to

174. See generally RALOGAIVAU, supra note 167.
175. Meron, supra note 145, at 359.
176. See generally RALOGAIVAU, supra note 167.
177. Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate & Steven C. Poe, Is the law a mere Parchment Barrier
to Human Rights Abuse?, 71 J. POL. 644, 649 (2009).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 180-186.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 187-188.
180. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, Preamble (S.Afr.).
181. Elizabeth Stanley, Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 39 J. MODERN
AFR. ST. 525, 531 (2001).
182. Id.
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come forward could be a substantial impediment to the creation of a full
historical record.
In such a case, it may be in the interests of justice to limit publicity
in a manner consistent with local tradition. In several developing states,
including Nigeria and other African countries, there has long been a
tradition of the administration of justice by a council of elders. 183 The
method is also quite prevalent in many Aboriginal cultures in Western
Australia. 184 In such scenarios, an aggrieving party is called before a
council of elders who will determine his fate.185
One potential solution to the TRC problem discussed above would
be the creation of a section that would be responsible for dealing only
with long past offenses in addition to a public forum for modern crimes.
This section would not be broadcast in an effort to ensure greater
participation, and thus a greater historical record, but to contrast the
significant disincentives to participate such as a communal shaming and
fears of retribution under previous TRC regimes. 186
The second problem that could be remedied by the flexibility of the
publicity requirement is the tremendous corruption that is possible
through communal trials. Many traditional systems of dispute resolution
allow for communal adjudication, in which many respected members of
a community are asked to determine the outcome of a trial. With
transitional justice mechanisms, the potential for punishment is high
enough to invite undue influence over judges by defendants and their
supporters. This includes vote buying and intimidation among other
methods. 187 A lack of publicity would be useful for hiding the identities
of those asked to partake in the judgment, thus limiting the potential for
corruption. 188
Finally is the flexibility of the speedy trial requirement. As
previously mentioned the right is twofold.189 Trials cannot be brought
quickly enough to negate the defendant treatment rights above, but
cannot be withheld for long enough that the pre-trial detention is similar

183. Gowon Emakpe, Expert suggests way to decongest Courts, NEXT (May 10, 2011, 2:14
AM), available at http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5698798-147/story.csp.
184. Aboriginal Customary Laws, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/P94_DP.pdf.
185. Id. at 85.
186. Eric Brahm, Truth Commissions, BEYOND INTRACTIBILITY (June 2004), available at
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/truth_commissions/.
187. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16-18
188. Id.
189. Mahoney, supra note 126.
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in form to retribution.190 As one advantage of the use of traditional
justice mechanisms is efficiency, any well-designed system need not
worry about the latter, so the only concern is the former.
One example of the importance of this flexibility is a hypothetical
system in which there is a singular day of adjudication; a system where
one day per month, issues are brought before a council that will decide
them all on that day. Such a system could be accommodated while
respecting international human rights, so long as that day is not near
enough as to negate the intractable defendant treatment rights discussed
above and fair enough away to make retribution redundant.191
Such flexibility would be vitally important for cultures that believe
strongly in special days for the convening of tribunals and adjudication
of disputes. While such an accommodation may seem trivial, in many
societies it may not be. In the case of Rwanda, the timing of the Gacaca
trials was exceptionally important. While the participation in the
preparatory stages of the trials was exceptionally high, many of the
tribunals themselves suffered from tremendously low participation. This
was due, in great part, to the timing of the trials. The initial trials began
during the sorghum harvest and not harvesting the grain was an
economic impossibility for many Rwandans. 192 Any system that does
not allow for such important elements is doomed to failure.
However, the above examples are not meant to be comprehensive.
The hypothetical and overarching nature of this paper demands only that
such examples be given in ways that demonstrate the flexibility of the
tribunal form rights. Each post-atrocity state is different and has
different requirements and goals for transitional justice, along with
different cultural backgrounds and traditions. These are all important
when incorporating traditional norms into transitional justice
mechanisms while respecting international human rights norms.
B.

Pitfalls to avoid

In concluding the article, let us first briefly re-examine the major
problems of previous transitional justice mechanisms discussed above.
The paper identifies four broad categories of problems that have
been prevalent in varying degrees in all of the historical transitional

190. See generally Mahoney, supra note 126.
191. Mahoney, supra note 126.
192. Rwanda: Gacaca Takes Off Slowly, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14 2002,
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200210150304.html.
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justice mechanisms. 193 The first was imposed justice, or the belief of
local populations that decisions for the state’s future are being made by
the international community that commands the purse strings. 194 The
second was a lack of respect for internationally recognized fair trial
rights. 195 The third criticism of previous mechanisms was a failure to
move the country forward in reconciliation.196 Finally, there has been a
complaint of extraordinary inefficiency. 197 All four of these issues must
be dealt within an effort to create a viable transitional justice
mechanism. 198
The first and third issues can be dealt with in kind. In order to
avoid the perception of imposed justice, as well as assist in the
reconciliation of a post-atrocity state, there must be substantial
incorporation of local traditions and norms. 199 By allowing a populace
to control its own destiny, it assists in the achievement of those goals.200
When examining this “bottom up” approach, Lundy and McGovern
discovered that the achievement of goals, including human rights and
others, by outsiders can be achieved only through meaningful
participation by the local populace. That is, “control over decision
making is itself central to the achievement of those rights.”201 When
applied to reconciliation, the logic goes as follows: by allowing a
populace to use its own system to attempt reconciliation, even if the
mechanism developed is not the first choice of the international
community, that system will likely be more successful because the
control over decision making is central to the achievement of the goal of
reconciliation. 202
Of course, local ownership is not the only necessity to avoid a
failure to reconcile.203 Systems must also avoid the seduction of victor’s

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Teitel, supra note 7, at 11.
See SG Report 2004, supra note 18.
Oomen, Justice Mechanisms, supra note 159, at 894-899.
See supra text accompanying note 76-85.
Mayer-Rieckh & De Greiff, supra note 95, at 80-120.
Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
SG Report 2004, supra note 18.
Id.
Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2, at 281.
TOBIAS PIETZ & LEOPOLD VON CARLOWITZ, CTR. FOR INT’L PEACE OPERATIONS, LOCAL
OWNERSHIP IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES IN FAILED STATES: APPROACHES, EXPERIENCES, AND
PREREQUISITES
FOR
SUCCESS
18
(2007),
available
at
http://www.zifberlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/Local_Ownership_
Workshop_Report_Dezember_07.pdf.
203. Gibson, supra note 173, at 543 (discussing the complex political, social and economic
structure that exists around post-conflict reconstruction).
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justice. 204 This has been the complaint of many systems throughout
history. 205 There is an extremely simple way to avoid this problem in
theory, but political realities often get in the way. It is vitally necessary
that all potential crimes be investigated, even those committed by the
victorious side of the conflict. Trials for the accused must be the same
in form and fairness, in stark contrast to the secret military trials by peers
of the RPF in Rwanda while Hutus faced open and public Gacaca trials.
It is not the intention of this paper to examine the potential political
inducements or imperatives that could avoid the pitfall; it is merely a
necessity for the success of any legal mechanism for post-atrocity
transitional justice. 206
The use of such local traditions often brings about the second
problem mentioned above. That is, the lack of respect for international
fair trials norms. 207 Derogation from fair trial rights would be equally
disastrous as the two problems discussed above, for that issue, a
framework for flexibility was drawn.
According to Justice Trechsel, the right to a fair trial before the
appeal can be broken down into the following: presumption of
innocence, the right to be informed of all charges, the right to examine
and refute witnesses and evidence, the right to counsel, an independent
and impartial tribunal, the right to publicity of trial, and the right to a
speedy trial. 208 Among these rights, the initial four have been
categorized as defendant treatment rights, or those rights that directly
affect how the defendant is treated.209 These rights have been
interpreted broadly and have such little leeway as to make the rights
fundamentally inflexible. There is no room within these rights to insert
any sort of local ownership or traditional norms. 210
However, the final three rights, the right to an independent and
impartial tribunal, the right to a public trial, and the right to a speedy
trial have been written and interpreted with considerable flexibility. 211
As it has been said previously, that does not imply any sort of lower

204. William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International
Criminal Court, 435 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 537 (2010).
205. Id.
206. For a more detailed discussion of the necessity to investigate both sides and the political
realities, see, Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001).
207. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
208. See supra text accompanying note 114.
209. See supra text accompanying note 115.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 123-142.
211. Meron, supra note 145, at 359.
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level of importance for these rights. 212 In fact, among them may be the
most important rights. The flexibility simply recognizes the necessity of
states, at certain points in their history, to make alterations to the tribunal
form rights to account for exigencies. There may be no greater exigency
than post-atrocity periods of transition. 213
The final problem was procedural. 214 That is, many transitional
justice mechanisms are extraordinarily inefficient.215 An answer to this
problem historically was the inclusion of local dispute settlement
mechanisms that are more efficient than formalist western-style
prosecutions such as the ICTR and ICTY. 216 By increasing the speed of
mechanisms it allows states to get out from under the shadows of
atrocities more quickly. 217 This potential is vitally important for postatrocity reconstruction and reconciliation.
As this article has identified the fundamental problems experienced
by past transitional justice mechanisms and created a framework under
which these problems could be remedied, it is now time to discuss what
the framework would look like for a hypothetical transitional justice
mechanisms that avoids the pitfalls of the past while incorporating local
norms and respects international fair trial rights. It is important to note
that this is a particularly daunting task and this article does not attempt
to create anything greater than a framework from which other systems
may draw. Every transitional justice situation is different. The needs of
a particular state depend on its culture, history, particulars of the past
atrocity, and many other elements. The drawing of a transnational
framework does not (and indeed cannot) attempt to encompass all
potential societies. It can, however, create an approach by which such
individualized systems can be created.
C.

Steps for an Individualized Framework

The first, and perhaps most underappreciated step that should take
place when attempting to create a transitional justice mechanism based
on local tradition and norms, is to determine the potential of the
traditional mechanism for bringing about peaceful reconciliation and
212. Id.
213. Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. QUART. 321, 357 (2009).
214. Mayer-Rieckh & De Greiff, supra note 95, at 80-120.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
216. Megan M. Westberg, Rwanda’s Use of Transitional Justice After Genocide: The Gacaca
Courts and the ICTR, 59 KAN. L. REV. 331, 332 (2011).
217. Id. at 360-362.
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change. While this may seem trivial, in his study on the Rwandan
Gacaca, Lars Waldorf points out the differences that exist in traditional
mechanisms. There are many variations of such systems that could be
tremendously problematic for their adaptation into transitional justice
mechanisms. Many such systems have traditionally been used in an
effort to maintain power structures. 218 It is easy to see why such a
system would be unacceptable, unless altered tremendously, for
something as fundamentally transformative as transitional justice.
Professor Waldorf also goes on to discuss the fact that many socalled traditional mechanisms bear a tremendous external imprint when
analyzed in detail. 219 In this instance, perception is more important than
reality. While systems that receive external funding and assistance may
bear some external imprint when studied closely, the perception and
acceptance of local ownership is far more important.220 As it is vital that
the adapted system appear to be local and organic, the external imprint
must, however, be miniscule. As long as there is a widespread
perception that the system is traditional, the actual history is immaterial.
The second important step is the inclusion of the local populace.221
As discussed earlier, Lundy and McGovern discovered the importance of
local participation with rights and mechanisms. 222 Regardless of the
form of the transitional justice mechanism, there will be no success
without the participation of the local populace.
While the first two steps are imperative, the word of the local
population, through leadership or referendum, should not be viewed as
infallible. It is imperative that the selection of a traditional mechanism
and the solicitation of local input do not supersede what is required
under the internationally recognized right to a fair trial.
This includes the fracture discussed in great detail above where the
defendant treatment rights are left untouched and the well-selected local
traditions and norms are inserted into the form of the tribunal.223 Under
this system, regardless of the state, culture, area or traditions, the
defendant is always entitled to certain things. 224 The defendant is always
given an attorney, always fully informed of the charges against them,
always given a right to present and rebut witnesses and evidence brought
218. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006).
219. Id.
220. Le Mon, supra note 46, at 16.
221. Lundy & McGovern, supra note 2, at 265.
222. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 115-158.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 115-142.
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about by the prosecution, and finally, the defendant is always presumed
to be innocent throughout all stages of the trial. 225
While the tribunal form rights are important, the appearance of said
rights can be completely different depending on the incorporation of
local traditions.226 For example, if, as was the case in Rwanda, a harvest
is an economic necessity of the entire population, it would not be
worthwhile to hold rounds of trials during the harvest.227 It would erode
participation and therefore local ownership. 228 The number of examples
is unending.
After the form of the tribunal has been determined, the most
important element is the fundamental fairness towards all parties.229
While victor’s justice is tempting for the long oppressed groups that
were able to win a civil war or cast off despotic oppression, such
temptations hamper future reconciliation. 230
This article by no means intends to over simplify or denigrate the
process of transitional justice through various prosecution or
prosecution-like mechanisms. Every system is different because the
needs of every post-atrocity state are different. Democratization is a
difficult and winding process. However, if good institutions are set up
that allow for justice and reconciliation while respecting international
human rights norms, the process will be markedly easier for future
transitional states.

225. Id.
226. See, e.g., RALOGAIVAU, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
227. Rwanda:
Gacaca
Takes
off
Slowly,
ALLAFRICA
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210150304.html.
228. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying text notes 206-207.
230. Id.
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